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 Government response to pandemics often mimic many other variables that have 
been noted to increase violence, such as increased individual restrictions, a negatively 
affected economy, or closed political opportunity structures. While the literature 
surrounding these topics are well-explored, there seems to be lack of research that seeks 
to learn if how a government responds to a pandemic produces the same results. The 
research question for this project is: How does government response to a pandemic 
influence the level of terrorism in that country? This paper seeks to provide insight to this 
question through a detailed case study of three government’s responses to pandemics, and 
a following descriptive statistics section which compares the number of terrorist attacks 
in that country during the time frame. 
 The cases under review will be A/H1N1, better known as Swine Flu, in Mexico in 
2009, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS) in China in 2003, and 
the Zika virus in Brazil in 2015. Each case study will be evaluated through an original 
analytic tool created for this project, dubbed the ‘pandemic report card’. Each country’s 
corresponding grade will then be compared to the trends of terrorist attacks in that 
country before, during, and after each pandemic. The results of this paper do not offer 
substantial evidence to conclude that a relationship exists between these two variables. 
While this research project accepts the null hypothesis, several other avenues for future 
research are laid out which builds from this project. 
Advisors and Readers 
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 The world has seen pandemics throughout history, from the Bubonic Plague to 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). Often to combat these 
pandemics, governments are forced to resort to more extreme measures such as enforcing 
restrictions on businesses, enacting travel restrictions, introducing quarantine, and 
encouraging social distancing. We have a general idea of what happens to a country post-
pandemic, such as a suffering economy, government restrictions, and even the rise of 
anti-government sentiment manifested through protests. These consequences of a 
pandemic are not far-fetched. A possible consequence of pandemics that is not largely 
researched, however, is the effect that these restrictive measures governments have on the 
level of terrorism that country will experience. Therefore, this paper will take those 
factors into the broader context of government effectiveness during a widespread virus to 
determine if government efforts against pandemics affect the level of terrorism as well. 
The research question for this paper is: how does government response to a pandemic 
affect the level of terrorism in that country? 
 This paper will pull from a variety of existing fields in social science research. It 
will consult the discussion on how the presence of political opportunity structures 
influence the presence of violence in a society, how government restrictions/repression 
breeds violence, how grievances produce government resistance, how a country’s 
economic health influences violence, how natural disasters in general affect violence, and 
the political consequences of pandemic responses. This research will also analyze the 
scholarly discussion of three recent pandemics in three different countries, and base 
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government performance off of guidelines set forward by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services. 
 This study will approach the topic from several avenues. First there will be a 
qualitative analysis of: A/H1N1 (Swine Flu) in Mexico in 2009; Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (SARS) in China in 2003; and Zika in Brazil in 2015. 
This information will be collected from scholarly articles that discuss the performance of 
each country in combatting their specific pandemic. These case studies will then be 
analyzed against four guidelines provided by a plan to combat pandemics provided by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the HHS Pandemic Influenza 
Plan. Next, descriptive statistics will be used to compare the level of political violent 
activity before, during, and after each virus in their specific country. This information 
will be gleaned from the Global Terrorism Database. Finally, the two sections will be 
compared to determine if there is a significant relationship or not. 
Literature Review 
The independent variable (IV) in this study is a qualitative evaluation of the 
response of governments to pandemics, and the dependent variable (DV) is the level of 
terrorism. Because this paper is looking to add value by explaining why terrorism 
increases in a certain situation, the following literature review will focus largely on 
addressing the scholarly discussion pertinent to the DV. While this section focuses 
primarily on the DV, below is a line of argumentation as to why it is also relevant to the 
IV. 
To explore the relationship between government response to a pandemic and the 
level of terrorism that a country experiences, the current scholarly discussion concerning 
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several topics must first be addressed. This paper must consult the relationship between 
factors that mimic potential government response to a pandemic, and their propensity to 
cause violence in general. By following this methodology, a logical chain of events can 
be drawn between the variables in this paper. The literature review will start by laying the 
foundation with ideas from social movement theory (SMT) which relate these ideas to the 
research topic at hand. Next, a section will discuss pertinent information concerning how 
direct consequences of pandemics and government response to those pandemics influence 
violence. Next, this section will explore how natural disasters act as a shock to the system 
and influence violence. Finally, the literature review will explicitly introduce the gap in 
the research that this paper seeks to address. 
Pertinent Aspects of Social Movement Theory 
 To ensure that the reader has an adequate grasp of how SMT is related to the topic 
at hand, one has to look no further than the work of Rodney Stark. Stark relays that one 
of the fundamental approaches to social movements is known as the collective behavior 
approach, which is the action of groups in response to real or perceived grievances.1 This 
applies to the relationship we are exploring because groups that engage in terrorism are a 
collective response to a grievance, which in this case is possibly the government response 
to a pandemic. Furthermore, Stark relays that along with the presence of grievances, one 
characteristic necessary for a social movement to exist is a precipitating event.2 Taking 
the idea of a precipitating event further, Beck relays that one aspect of a three-fold 
theoretical SMT approach to social movements is the presence of political opportunities 
 




or external constraints.3 Beck’s elaboration of this idea is important as it frames 
precipitating events in a light amicable to this paper, which is the reaction of the 
population to an initial government action. 
 It is important to note that the ideas above mention social movements. Groups that 
engage in terrorism fall under the umbrella of social movements, but are characterized 
differently due to their violent nature. In expanding these ideas in SMT to the topic at 
hand, a few similarities are noticeable. First, grievances are often a necessary component 
for a social movement to be born. Secondly, the emergence of the pandemic or certain 
government reactions to the pandemic, may very well act as a precipitating event. 
Whatever the event is, if it is enough of a shock to the general populace, it is possible that 
social movements follow.  
Political Opportunity Structures and Violence 
 Political opportunity structures (POS) are institutions or characteristics of 
government functions which allow individuals to either enact change or restrict their 
ability to challenge the government. Some studies have found that open POS reduce the 
risk of violence, while closed POS have the propensity to increase the possibility of 
violence.4 While looking at protests in American cities and the effect their POS has on 
the occurrence of protests, Eisinger found that the chance of protests and anti-government 
sentiment often increases when open POS are not present.5 While noting the near 
impossibility to generally classify POS as they differ country to country, Gleditsch and 
 
3 Beck, Colin. “The contribution of Social Movement Theory to Understanding Terrorism.” Social 
Compass 2, no. 5, 2008: 1565-1581. 
4 Eisinger, Peter. “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities.” The American Political Science 
Review, 67, no. 1, 1973, 11-28.; Gleditsch, K., and Ruggeri, A. “Political opportunity structures, 
democracy, and civil war.” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3, 2010: 299-310. 
5 Eisinger, Peter. “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities.” The American Political Science 
Review, 67, no. 1, 1973, 11-28. 
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Ruggeri state that strong democratic institutions decrease the risk of conflict.6 For our 
purposes, democratic regimes can be externalized as open POS as democratic regimes are 
often identified by these institutions, such as freedom speech, free and fair elections, etc. 
 It is important to note that POS do not have to be physical institutions, but can be 
foundational ideas inherent in a government as well such as transparency or freedom of 
speech. Both domestic and international transparency have been found to have a positive 
relationship with the level of terrorist attacks committed.7 The researchers theorize that 
transparency, while a positive trait in many instances, has the possibility to attract 
terrorism due to the publicity they will receive.8 This idea of terrorist organizations being 
attracted to transparent targets is important, as transparency is a fundamental aspect in an 
effective government response to a pandemic. 
 It is important to consider how POS affect violence because this relationship can 
be directly expanded to a government response to pandemics and its effect on violence. 
As open and closed styles of POS either enable or disable the population’s ability to enact 
change, pandemics can often result in restrictions by the government on the population. 
While POS are related to enacting governmental change, parallels between this academic 
conversation and this research question are present. In general, a closed POS, which is 
noted to cause anti-government sentiment, are government restrictions on the population. 
As stated earlier, during pandemics, governments may enact restrictions, which draws the 
connection between these two ideas.   
 
6 Gleditsch, K., and Ruggeri, A. “Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war.” Journal of 
Peace Research 47, no. 3, 2010: 299-310. 
7 Bell, Sam, Chad Clay, Amanda Murdie, and James Piazza. “Opening Yourself Up: The Role of External 
and Internal Transparency in Terrorism Attacks.” Political Research Quarterly 67, no. 3, 2014: 603-614. 
8 Ibid. 
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Government Restrictions and Violence 
 There remains a back-and-forth discussion in academia concerning the effect of 
government repression on the occurrence of violence. Some scholars have taken the 
stance that government repression is often ineffective in efforts to quell dissent and 
decrease the strength of anti-government forces.9 While looking at a cross-natural study 
of the effect government repression has on counterinsurgency efforts, Hultquist finds that 
while repression has merits in certain circumstances, more often than not, state repression 
causes further conflict.10 Granted, most of the debate in academia concerning government 
repression and violence concerns violent repression or indiscriminate violence enforced 
upon the population. While this takes repression to an extreme, it still presents the idea 
that as governments use more restrictive measures, violence is more likely. 
 To further this point in connection with this research project, we need to look no 
further than the comparison some scholars have made in the theoretical realm of the 
relationship between freedom and violence.11 Categorizing countries on a scale of one 
through six, with one being the least repressive and six being the most, Wolfgang relays 
that governments who are either highly permissive or highly restrictive experience low 
levels of violence.12 On the other hand, it is those countries in the middle spectrum or the 
level of restrictiveness who experience more violence.13 This is an important perspective 
to note as it relates directly to the research question at hand. Granted that governments 
are not likely to respond to pandemics in widespread violence against civilians, however, 
 
9 Hultquist, Philip. “Is Collective Repression an Effective Counterinsurgency Technique? Unpacking the 
Cyclical Relationship between Repression and Civil Conflict.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 
34, no. 5, 2017: 507-525. 
10 Ibid. 




they are likely to increase restrictions which encroach on individual liberties, such as 
restrictions on movement or forced business closures. So, while repression might not be 
as intense as possible, as we saw above, slight increases in restrictions are known to have 
increased the level of violence. 
Economic Considerations and Violence 
 While this next section might have a seemingly intuitive nature, it is important to 
consider the effect that economic considerations, especially poverty, have on the level of 
internal violence a country experiences. Certain economic characteristics, such as lower 
GDP per capita, youth unemployment, and the need to feel financially stable are all 
incubators for internal violence; this is in fact a self-feeding cycle, since countries that 
have experienced major acts of violence have a civilian population who is 21% poorer 
than stable countries.14 The World Bank Group admits that there are numerous countries 
with poor economic standings who do not succumb to internal violence, however, it is the 
combination of internal stressors, such as unemployment, and external economic 
stressors, such as price shocks, that increase a country’s propensity to internal conflict.15 
A common characteristic of pandemics is a negatively affected economy, either through 
domestic sectors being damaged or through the international response to isolate and 
restrict movement to the country affected. 
 Just as negative domestic economic characteristics increase the chance of 
violence, so do external shocks.16 While comparing the external shock of the lack of 
 
14 The World Bank Group. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. 
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. “Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An 
Instrumental Variables Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 112, no. 4, 2004: 725-753. 
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rainfall on African countries’ economies, researchers generalized the findings to conclude 
that a negative shock on national growth of at least 5% increases the chances of internal 
conflict by 50%.17 Unfortunately, if economic shocks are severe enough, a self-feeding 
cycle begins of poor economies causing violence and violence causing low human 
development.18 These ideas are extractable to the research at hand as it identifies not only 
the risk of poor economic characteristics and its ability to cause violence, but the circular 
cycle it creates if harsh enough.  
Natural Disasters and Violence 
 Getting into the direct correlation between natural disasters and its effect on 
violence, there are several considerations that need to be made. While largely unstudied 
in academia, some studies have concluded the positive relationship between natural 
disasters and violence.19 Nel and Righarts found that countries that experienced natural 
disasters are 50 times more likely to have violence follow than those who did not 
experience a natural disaster, with natural disasters resulting in large geological 
destruction causing the most violence, i.e. earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.20 While 
disasters such as infections and insect infestations posed the least likely to increase the 
chance of violence, it was noted that any disaster which increases grievances, resource 
grabs, and the necessity of collective action response, all destabilize society.21 
Just as natural disasters cause violence, there are related factors associated to 
pandemics which increase the possibility of violence. Viruses have a profound effect on 
 
17 Ibid. 
18 Kim, Namsuk and Pedro Conceicao. “The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict, and Human Development.” 
International Journal of Peace Studies 15, no. 1, 2010: 29-43. 
19 Nel, Philip and Marjolein Righarts. “Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict.” 




society, with early cases showing us how the presence of unexplained disasters can cause 
humans to look for explanations, such as anti-Semitic violence during the Bubonic 
Plague or discrimination against Africans in China for fear of spreading Ebola.22 While 
science has evolved over time and helped us find explanations, other studies have looked 
at more contemporary ideas. The presence of health care facilities, entities, and 
personnel, present a target for violent attacks.23 The World Health Organization (WHO) 
found that between 2014 and 2015, there were 594 attacks on various entities of the 
health care sector, with 62% of these attacks being intentional.24  
Political Implications of Pandemic Responses 
 When one considers the relationship between states, violent non-state actors 
(VNSAs), and the population, one should consider social contract theory and legitimacy. 
States have a social contract with their population to grant protection, services, and other 
human needs that grants the state legitimacy in the eyes of the population.25 This is 
essentially an agreement from the government to provide for the population, and for the 
population to be governed. When states shirk on this duty, be it intentional malpractice or 
inability to perform, they lose legitimacy and VNSAs could seek to both decreases state 
legitimacy and increase their own through both violent and non-violent means.26  
 
22 Madhav, Nita, Ben Oppenheim, Mark Gallivan, Prime Mulembakani, Edward Rubin, and Nathan Wolfe. 
“Chapter 17 Pandemics: Risks, Impacts, and Mitigation.” Disease Control Priorities: Improving Health 
and Reducing Poverty. 3rd edition. (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/ The World Bank, 2017): 315-346. 
23 World Health Organization. Report on Attacks on Health Care in Emergencies: Based on Consolidated 
Secondary Data 2014 and 2015. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 2016). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Grynkewich, Alexus. “Welfare as Warfare: How Violent Non-State Groups Use Social Services to 
Attack the State.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4, 2008: 351. 
26 Ibid, 353-355. 
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 Anti-government groups and VNSAs alike might accentuate their attacks against 
state legitimacy with influence activities that seek to erode public trust in institutions 
which could result in an increased acceptance or participation in terrorism.27 While this 
paper does not delve into influence activities, it does seek to explore the political 
repercussions of government response to a pandemic. As has been laid out by the 
previous sections, government responses are often restrictive and antithetical to 
democracy and individual liberty. Returning to the topic at hand, it may be possible that 
should states shirk in their response duties and do not effectively respond to the 
pandemic, VNSAs could seek to exploit this through violent and non-violent means to 
further their goals.  
The Gap 
 The review of the current literature of this research topic has drawn a road map 
for the reader. Governments often have to place restrictions on the population to fight a 
pandemic and economies are often negatively affected due to pandemics, both of which 
cause violence. These are direct consequences of the presence of a pandemic, and by 
deduction, produce a logical conclusion that pandemics can increase the risk of violence. 
To further this line of argumentation, natural disasters in general cause violence and the 
presence of healthcare entities responding to pandemics have been intentionally targeted 
with violence in certain countries.  
 While remarkably similar to the deductions possible from this collection of works, 
this research’s originality is grounded in how the research question is asked. While Nel 
and Righarts previously touched on the lack of an explanatory relationship between the 
 
27 Ingram, Haroro. “The Strategic Logic of State and Non-State Malign ‘Influence Activities’.” The RUSI 
Journal 165, no. 1, 2020: 13. 
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presence of epidemics and violence, this paper looks to address a gap in the current 
discussion.28 Nel and Righarts looked at simply the presence of epidemics and their effect 
on subsequent violent outburst, this paper will qualitatively evaluate the way in which 
governments responded to epidemics and the effect that has on violence. Furthermore, 
this paper narrows the discussion from violence to terrorism. 
Hypothesis 
 The alternative hypothesis for this research is that countries whose governments 
better followed pandemic response best-practices will experience lower levels of 
terrorism during and after the pandemic as opposed to governments which did not. In 
other words, as a country’s government better responds to the pandemic located in their 
country, there will be less instances of terrorism during and after the pandemic. The null 
hypothesis for this project is that there will be no signification relationship between how 
a government responds to a pandemic and the level of terrorism. A visualization of the 
alternative hypothesis can be found in Figure 1. 
 
 
28 Nel, Philip and Marjolein Righarts. “Natural Disasters and the Risk of Violent Civil Conflict.” 
International Studies Quarterly 52, 2008: 159-185. 
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Variables and Operationalization 
 This study will seek to tie in all subsequent areas into a relationship between two 
variables. The IV is how a government responds to a pandemic. The IV will be gleaned 
by the case study analysis which will eventually give all countries a grade in four criteria 
and an overall average of those sections. The information in the case studies will be 
gleaned from peer-reviewed journals, reports from established organizations, and 
reputable media sites as needed. The grading criteria for the pandemic report card will be 
informed by the HHS document, HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan.29 The sampling for this 
variable was completed by stratified sampling, with the population being every country in 
the world and the sample being randomly decided through only those countries who have 
had pandemics. This paper will consider pandemics to be viruses that fall under Phase 
Six, or the pandemic phase, of the World Health Organization pandemic phases; which is 
identified by outbreaks of the same virus in countries in a separate WHO region.30 
 The DV is the level of terrorism. This information will be observed through the 
Study of Terrorism and Reponses to Terrorism-University of Maryland Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD).31 The sampling for this data is purposive sampling. The population is 
every instance of terrorism in every country, but the sample must be restricted by the 
countries found in the IV. Therefore, the sample was purposefully chosen from each 
country included in the case study in each relevant timeframe.  
 
29 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. November 2005. 
30 World Health Organization. Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: A WHO Guidance 
Document. (Geneva, Switzerland; World Health Organization, 2009). 
31 University of Maryland. Global Terrorism Database. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
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I have chosen to measure terrorism for the main reason that terrorism is political 
in nature.32 The literature review was focused under the umbrella of SMT, which often 
theorizes about efforts to enact political change, as well as addressed the political 
consequences of a government’s response to a pandemic. The second reason is that the 
GTD is the most comprehensive database on terrorism and is a reputable source of 
information, so focusing on terrorism and using one centralized database to inform the IV 
increases the reliability of data collection for that variable. The operationalization of this 
variable will be based off of the statistics presented by the GTD because it is the “most 
comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist attacks in the world” and since they 
have based collection off of a single, un-changing definition of terrorism since their 
inception, there is a constant data collection methodology.33 
Methodology 
 This research project will start with a comprehensive case study on three different 
countries and three different pandemics. The countries and their respective pandemics are 
chosen randomly based off of certain parameters. Illnesses that make up the possible 
sample are any virus that spreads across country borders, and more specifically spread to 
other WHO regions. After the cases are selected, the information collected will be guided 
by the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, which was created for “preparedness planning and 
response activities”34 to pandemics. The same guiding information from this document 
will then be used as an analytic tool in the ‘pandemic report card’.  
 
32 Richards, Anthony. “Conceptualizing Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37, no. 3, 2014: 213-
236. 
33 University of Maryland. Global Terrorism Database. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. 
34 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan. November 2005. 
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The pandemic report card is a grading scale created specifically for this project. 
The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan was created in response to an uncertainty in response 
capabilities of the H5N1 virus and thus is centered around influenzas specifically. While 
this document is targeted towards influenzas preparation, I have decided that it is 
acceptable for other viruses as well since the underlying assumptions of the plan are also 
relevant in the case studies selected. The assumptions are: widespread transmissibility of 
the virus, asymptomatic cases while still infectious, great demands on healthcare systems, 
shortages in vaccines and antivirals, and disruption of community infrastructure.35 One 
assumption: simultaneous outbreaks across the U.S. has been omitted given that none of 
the cases selected focus on the U.S. It should also be noted, that HHS updates this 
document periodically, and thus the document chosen to guide the pandemic report card 
is not the most up to date version. However, this version is adequate for this study as we 
are only looking for general and concrete ways to prepare for and respond to an epidemic. 
The 2005 HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan addresses those issues in general categories. 
The most up to date version, created in 2017, splits the general categories of the 2005 
document into more categories. Therefore, while the 2017 document would result in more 
grading fields in the report card, it addresses the same general grading fields informed by 
the 2005 document.   
Next, we will consider terrorist activity in each country studied in the case study 
section. This section will collect information on the number of attacks two years before, 
during, and two years after each pandemic in each country. The attacks under 
consideration will be any group active in the country of concern during the relevant time 
 
35 Ibid, 5. 
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frame who conducted terrorist attacks. After this data is collected, it will be compared to 
several descriptive statistic benchmarks such as mean, median, and mode; as well as be 
compared with scatterplots and trendlines to show the overall trend of violent activity in 
each country. 
Case Study Analysis 
 This next section will dive into the case studies of three different pandemics in 
three different countries. First, the original analytic tool created for this project will be 
introduced, along with the underlying logic behind it. The current scholarly discussion 
surrounding these cases will be consulted, relayed, and then analyzed so that a clear 
understanding of government performance while combatting their pandemic can be 
gleaned. At the end of each case study, each country will receive their ‘pandemic report 
card’ which grades government response to the pandemic based on pre-established 
guidelines. 
Pandemic Report Cards  
 The pandemic report card will consist of four sections which are designated as 
practices that HHS was taking in preparation for an influenza pandemic. The four 
sections are as followed: surveillance, investigation, and protective public health 
measures; vaccines and antivirals; healthcare and emergency response; and 
communications and outreach.36 As this document delves into detail concerning U.S., and 
more specifically HHS, efforts to combat a pandemic, the cases will not be held to the 
standard that the HHS sets forward in this document. However, the broad sections listed 
above will be used to inform this research on the fields necessary for an adequate 
 
36 Ibid, F-35 – F-41. 
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response. Each case study will be laid out with enough detail so as to touch on each 
section, and for the audience to gain insight into that country’s overall response efforts in 
that category. In each category, there will be a grade of A, which is the best score, 
through F, which is the worst score and subsequent reasoning behind that grade. Each 
line of reasoning will include a (+) to denote a positive aspect, or a (-) to denote a 
negative aspect. A visualization of the pandemic report card can be seen in Figure 2. 
Finally, each country will receive an overall categorization of their response of either 
failed, below average, average, above average, or excellent. These categories will be 
informed by the total points received in the pandemic report card; the legend that will 
inform letter grade translation to numerical score and the evaluation category 




 It is important to note that while efforts have been made to ensure clear and 
standardized grading of each case along the four guidelines, case studies are inherently 
open to interpretation by the researcher. Sound reasoning will be given as to why each 
grade was given. However, as there is no standardized global response plan or data set 
which grades each of these cases on centralized actions and benchmarks, different grades 
might be given to each country based on the researcher. It is important to note that the 
analysis of each case was completed by the same researcher, and the specific letter grade 
a country received in each characteristic section of the pandemic report card is not the 
most vital aspect of the paper. What is important is to lay out the general idea of how 
each government’s overall response compared to the other case studies selected so one 
can gauge which countries responded better than others. 
Mexico and Swine Flu in 2009 
 In 2009, Mexico experienced an outbreak of A/H1N1, better known as Swine Flu. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) categorized Swine Flu as a pandemic on June 11, 
2009 and rescinded the pandemic label on August 10, 2009.37 An influenza variant that 
spreads heavily among pigs, the 2009 outbreak of Swine Flu was a variant of the seasonal 
H1N1 virus that has been in circulation since 1977.38 The 2009 Swine Flu outbreak was 
 
37 “WHO Pandemic Declaration”. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.; “WHO recommendations 
for the post-pandemic period.” World Health Organization. 
38 “What is the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus?” World Health Organization. February 24, 2010. 
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different than previous outbreaks of the virus as it transmitted not primarily through pigs, 
but through human-human contact.39 Swine Flu has a known incubation period between 
one and four days, with the contagious period starting around one day after symptoms are 
present and last for around six days.40 In addition to the common symptoms associated 
with influenza, the 2009 A/H1N1 outbreak saw an increased report of vomiting and 
diarrhea, with causes of death attributed to high fever, respiratory failure, pneumonia, 
kidney failure, dehydration and hypertension, and electrolyte imbalances.41 
 Mexico was applauded in certain preparedness measures, such as having a 
stockpile of more than one million antiviral treatments and equipment which were rapidly 
mobilized, and had previously gathered, tested, and utilized communication materials 
which resulted in a well-developed media campaign.42 Despite adhering to an influenza 
preparedness plans, Mexico was caught off-guard by the A/H1N1 outbreak in 2009. The 
Mexican government operated on the assumption that any new pandemic would not be 
domestic-borne and would thus give Mexico a window of two weeks to prepare a 
response.43 Overall, Mexico adequately implemented preparedness plans and followed 
global guidelines, but failed to overlook assumptions of where the virus would originate 
which resulted in a delayed domestic response.  
 While Mexico was unprepared for a domestic outbreak, one of the most 
applauded aspects of the Mexican government’s response to the pandemic was the quick 
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action in notifying the international community of the situation and rapidly sharing 
isolates which helped create a vaccine.44 While the domestic response to a pandemic is 
vitally important in determining how government actions would affect the population, the 
level of transparency and international cooperation notifies the world of the extreme 
nature of the situation. The cooperation between Mexico, the U.S., and Canada included 
mass communication systems, pandemic preparation plans, and sharing of doctors and 
supplies.45 Mexico’s president, Felipe Calderon, recognized the inabilities in Mexico’s 
response capabilities, and the duty of his administration to both seek the best help 
possible for Mexicans and notify other countries of the gravity of the virus.   
While Mexico rightly sought help with their North American neighbors, this 
reliance on international aid is inherent of domestic problems in Mexico. Poor domestic 
surveillance systems failed to identify infections in rural areas, Mexican laboratories were 
ill prepared to deal with the virus on their own, and an inherent lack of trust between the 
government and academia resulted in little to no attempts to recruit Mexican resources 
outside of the official health care sector.46 Most of the related failures can likely be 
attributed to the assumption that any pandemic would not be domestic-borne, which did 
not allow Mexico to further prepare and forced their hand for immediate action. Some 
challenges noted from Mexico’s response plan were the lack of an effective early 
detection system to minimize the delay between virus emergence and response by health 
care officials, as well as the lack of specialization, funding, and staffing of Mexican state 
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laboratories.47 While these factors and more, attributed to the lack of domestic response 
capable by Mexico, comprehensive review plans and proactive actions have since been 
undertaken to make Mexico self-reliant on combatting viruses.48 
Thanks to international cooperation, a vaccine was soon created to treat Swine 
Flu. Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. worked together to research, create, and distribute 
antivirals and vaccines.49 Again, Mexico aptly recognized the limitations of its own 
research and development capabilities, and utilized their equally-effected neighbors to the 
north to rapidly find a vaccine. While they were successful in this measure, distributing 
the vaccine posed a dilemma. Mexico did not have a vaccine distribution plan ready and 
often fell prey to vaccine production delays, nor could some Mexicans afford the 
expensive vaccine.50  
The transparency that the Mexican government responded to the pandemic with, 
resulted in rapid government restrictions and community action being taken to restrict 
transmission of the virus. The Mexican president closed schools, movie theatres, and 
restaurants, and large gatherings were pursued at one’s own discretion; by these 
measures, the Mexican government was trying to enforce social distancing. 51 Mexico 
often aired public health experts on the news or sent out pertinent information directly to 
Mexicans, and thus the community response to the virus was unparalleled. The 
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community took this information and began modifying their social norms by wearing 
masks, focusing more on daily hygiene, and enforcing social distancing efforts.52 One of 
the unfortunate repercussions of the Mexican government’s transparency was a negative 
impact on their already struggling economy; Mexico lost 1% of their GDP, which was 
around $9billion USD, and certain sectors such as tourism were hard-hit.53 
 The response of Mexico’s health care system featured both successes and failures. 
Case studies looking at the mortality rate of Swine Flu in Mexico City at the National 
Institute of Respiratory Diseases concluded that out of records of 18 patients identified 
with the virus, 67% died.54 However, studies that looked at records from the Hospital 
Civil de Guadalajara concluded that clinical staff were later able to correctly identify 
those most and least vulnerable to the illness so that patients could be handled as either 
outpatients or be hospitalized.55 This system was a success with only 1% of patients 
needing re-evaluation and of the 104 patients hospitalized only 1% of them died.56 
Despite certain areas experiencing more deaths than others, Mexican health care systems 
showed a process of learning and ingenuity that correctly identified vulnerable patients 
and kept the system from getting overwhelmed.  
 The above synopsis of the Mexican government’s efforts combatting Swine Flu 
informs the pandemic report card found below in Figure 3. The reasoning behind each 
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grade relates to information covered above. Mexico’s overall response was above 
average, with a total score of 16. 
 
China and SARS in 2003 
 SARS was first experienced in Guangdong province in China in November of 
2002. WHO issued a global alert in March of 2003. 57 This was prompted when SARS 
was noticed to have spread internationally to different WHO regions starting around the 
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Health Organization. September 26, 2003. 
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end of February 2003, which would then classify SARS in the confines of this project as 
a pandemic. The virus was relatively short-lived, with the last cases being reported in 
China around June 2003 and internationally around the end of July 2003, despite sporadic 
new cases on a much smaller scale.58 A total of 8,098 cases are associated worldwide 
with SARS, to include 774 deaths.59 The major common symptoms of SARS include 
high fever, respiratory symptoms, pneumonia, along with other minor symptoms such as 
dry cough and body aches.60 While there is still debate over what the exact source of this 
virus is, some have given strong evidence that bats sold at markets in China are a likely 
contender, from which human-to-human transmission began.61 
 At the time of SARS, China’s level of preparedness was not adequate compared 
to what was required by the epidemic. There was no government entity responsible for 
surveilling infectious diseases, there was no centralized system by which health care 
officials could report cases, state laws classify possible infectious diseases as a state 
secret, and public hysteria resulted in mass purchases which depleted reserves of 
antibiotics and flu medicine.62 Despite a lack of preparation on part of the Chinese, they 
seem to make up for that in part due to their ability to quickly implement restrictions and 
regulations. This will be touched on later in the case study, but given that China is an 
authoritarian government, they can bypass some of the bureaucratic obstacles other 
countries face given their style of governance. 
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 China’s communication and transparency concerning SARS is often described by 
researchers in a negative light. To visualize this, a timeline of SARS does well: the first 
case was identified in China in November of 2002, the Chinese government spent the 
winter of 2002 trying to cover up the virus, and Chinese officials did not given details of 
the virus to WHO until March of 2003.63 Granted, with the emergence of a new virus 
there might be a period of time where the virus has not yet been identified as a major 
health concern. However, the miscommunication and intentional cover up of the virus 
indicates that this was not the case. The five-month gap between the first identified case 
in China and notification of the disease to WHO is representative of how the Chinese 
government has tried to deal with cases of the virus inside their borders.  
 Internally, China shows just as much malpractice in communication and 
transparency as they did internationally. The Chinese government repressed information 
by censoring journalists and threatening imprisonment for spreading rumors concerning 
SARS.64 These actions should not surprise the international community, as they are often 
characteristic of the authoritarian governance model of China. However, they do 
represent a complete lapse in judgement and negligence of their obligation to not only 
protect their citizens but limit domestic-born dangers to the international community. It 
was not until after a press conference on April 22, 2003 that China’s government warned 
government officials not to cover up the virus anymore, relayed the importance of 
reporting possible SARS cases, and issued daily briefings to citizens about the actual 
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number of cases.65  While China eventually recognized their mistake and addressed the 
virus publicly, their failure in doing so immediately resulted in widespread international 
and domestic transmission of the virus. 
 As previously mentioned, China’s lack of communication and transparency 
largely enabled the virus to spread. The majority of international cooperation seems to 
stem from the WHO and other WHO countries. It was noted that despite other countries 
regularly updating the WHO on SARS cases and developments directly after the WHO 
global alert, China did not start regular communication until late April, about a month 
later.66 Likewise, WHO investigation teams were denied entry to China for a time, and 
positive control measures implemented in Guangdong were not shared with other 
provinces or internationally until the end of April.67 Seemingly, even after China 
recognized that transparency was needed, they further shirked on this duty by a lack of 
international cooperation and continued instances of a lack of communication. 
 Despite the lack of immediate response to SARS, China eventually ameliorated 
their response and containment efforts. China recognized the lack of a centralized 
surveillance method to track new SARS cases and created local entities responsible for 
identifying new cases and sharing that information with Beijing.68 This addressed one of 
the major flaws in stemming identifying where new cases were coming from and 
addressing those regions specifically. One of the most encompassing government 
measures was the identification of SARS as an infectious disease on April 8, 2003. This 
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allowed the government to legally implement isolation measures like travel restrictions, 
quarantine, contact tracing, etc.69 The same attribute that influenced the lack of 
transparency and communication in the early-stages of SARS are likely to thank for the 
effective and wide-reaching containment measures, the authoritarian nature of China.  
 Government restrictions to combat the virus eventually influenced the rise of 
community and social measures. Certain public establishments were closed, neighbors 
were encouraged to monitor and report unidentified SARS cases, and the public 
eventually adopted to the situation and started wearing and buying face masks in bulk.70 
The addition of community measures in China’s response to SARS was likely a large 
reason for the short life-span of the virus. Without the community on board to heed 
government orders, and take it upon themselves to be proactive in curbing the virus, the 
lack of preparedness and timely response by the Chinese government might have resulted 
in insurmountable obstacles despite vast containment efforts. 
 The Chinese government’s efforts towards creating a vaccine to prevent and cure 
SARS were mediocre at best. It was reported that on July 1, 2003, China had approved a 
vaccine for human testing that was concluded successful in animal tests.71 While it was 
noted that China was in need of the vaccine more than any other SARS-affected country, 
they were moving at a much faster rate than others which could call into question the 
safety surrounding human trials. As of the end of July 2003, when the virus was 
contained and no longer considered a global health concern, there was still no SARS 
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vaccine suitable for human use.72 While not a problem specific to China, the inability of 
the international community, China included, to find a suitable vaccine during the 
pandemic are most likely explained by the novelty of the virus, effectiveness of 
containment methods, and indicative of a global unpreparedness for vaccine development 
in such a virus. 
 The response of China’s health care system had both positive and negative 
outcomes. Still inflicted by the late response, China created local triage centers to screen 
for SARS cases but were soon overrun and eventually started to isolate probable SARS 
cases in entire hospitals.73 Generally, China has avoided adequate funding in its health 
care system. Despite a below-average response to SARS mid-pandemic, China was noted 
to not have even have a properly prepared health care system before the pandemic. At the 
time of SARS, China was lacking technology, analysis skills, diagnostic means, and 
treatment methods; beyond that it was noted that officials would move sick patients as 
WHO officials were expected for investigation.74 Despite some modest attempts of the 
Chinese health care system to combat the virus as it was unfolding, China was largely 
unprepared to deal with a situation like this and it seems to have showed. 
 The above synopsis of the Chinese government’s efforts combatting SARS 
informs the pandemic report card found below in Figure 4. The reasoning behind each 
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grade relates to information covered above. China’s overall response was below average 
with a total score of 9. 
 
Brazil and Zika in 2015 
 Zika has been a normal occurrence in Brazil in the past. However, during 2015, 
they experienced a large increase in babies born with neurological disorders, specifically 
Guillain-Barre syndrome and microcephaly, which was suspected to be connected to 
Zika.75 This particular outbreak resulted in 1.5 million cases of Zika and above average 
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reports of babies with neurological disorders.76 The large increase in infections eventually 
left Brazil and was noticed in other countries in the Americas, which lead the WHO to 
issue a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) in February 2016.77 
Due to information gleaned on the necessary long-term response to combat Zika and its 
related neurological disorders, the WHO ended the PHEIC on November 18, 2016.78 Zika 
is spread through the Aedes aegypti mosquito by biting an infected person and then biting 
a healthy person which transmits the virus, sexual intercourse, or can be inherited through 
pregnancy.79 Despite the concern raise about the 2016 Zika outbreak, symptoms are mild 
and deaths are rare, with the possible connection of Zika to neurological disorders fueling 
most of the concern behind the increase of cases. While antivirals have been used in some 
instances, there is currently no vaccine for Zika. 
 In terms of surveillance, Brazil succeeded in noticing the sudden increase in 
neurological disorders in connection to Zika rather quickly. Brazil had several platforms 
through which surveillance and investigation of upcoming epidemic threats are noticed, 
such as: the national notifiable information system, information systems on mortality, 
public hospital discharge, and the public health events registry which was created mid-
epidemic in response to the anomaly.80 Despite having a plethora of information systems 
to surveil for new cases, researchers have found them to be lacking depth in terms of 
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identifiable factors of new patients which would help to evaluate risks to separate socio-
economic contexts.81 As we have seen in the previous cases, surveillance is a vital aspect 
of epidemic response as it helps identify those most vulnerable and can inform actions to 
address the continuous influx of new cases. Overall, Brazil seemed prepared on this front, 
but lacked the necessary details in their systems to allow the government to narrow down 
afflicted areas to certain communities. 
 Researchers have not uncovered any active measures by Brazilian authorities to 
distort or suppress information concerning Zika. Once international organization like 
WHO and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) were introduced to the scene, 
communication and transparency were prioritized. With the 2016 Olympics coming to 
Brazil during the Zika epidemic, PAHO and Brazilian authorities worked together to 
combat the disease as well as provide timely information concerning the risks and 
combative measures taken.82 Despite transparency and open communication, Brazil’s 
communication to the public was not adequate. The government often issued confusing 
communication regarding the risk of Zika, lack of transparency on public health data, and 
concerns over the continuation of the 2016 Olympics despite Zika caused public panic 
and a large amount of the scientific community publicly calling for the Olympic games to 
be canceled.83 
 In light of the increased concern of the connection between Zika and other 
disorders, the Brazilian government issued a three-prong approach to the problem: 
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controlling the mosquito population, availability of healthcare, and development of 
technology and research capabilities.84 As Zika is spread through mosquitos, the 
Brazilians recognized that the fundamental way to combat future cases was to reduce the 
vehicles through which the virus could be spread. Efforts to control the transmission 
vehicle, or vector, included mosquito population suppression, release of sterile mosquitos 
into the population, resident inspections to locate mosquito breeding grounds, pesticides, 
and removing mosquito habitats such as standing water.85 Despite the importance of 
addressing the source of Zika transmission and the Brazilian government’s heavy 
targeting of mosquito populations, they overlooked key fundamental problems with 
Brazilian infrastructure that negates some of their efforts. 
 Despite the Brazilian government’s efforts to eliminate standing water at 
residences, the underlying lack of water and sewage infrastructure forces the population 
to continue to collect and add to standing water reservoirs. Around one-third of Brazilians 
do not have access to continuous public water and sanitation, which forces the population 
to keep standing water for use and open sewage flowing in uncovered drains and 
ditches.86 Brazilian government procedure requires that local, state, and federal 
governments respond to sanitation concerns together, however poor economic 
considerations and bureaucracy have fueled an inadequate response to address the lack of 
infrastructure.87  
 
84 Gomez, Eduardo, Fernanda Perez, and Deisy Ventura. “What explains the lackluster response to Zika in 
Brazil? Exploring institutional, economic and health system context.” BMJ Global Health 3, no. 5, 2018: 2. 
85 Ibid, 2; Lowe, Rachel, Christoven Barcellos, Patricia Brasil, Oswaldo Cruz, Nildimar Honorio et al. “The 
Zika Virus Epidemic in Brazil: From Discovery to Future Implications.” International Journal of 
Environmental Research and Public Health 15, no. 96, 2018: 8. 
86 Wurth, Margaret, Joao Bieber, and Amanda Klasing. Neglected and Unprotected: The Impact of the Zika 
Outbreak on Women and Girls in Northeastern Brazil. (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 2017): 23. 
87 Ibid, 24.  
 32 
 With access to health care being one of the pillars in Brazil’s approach to Zika, it 
would be assumed that a heavy focus was placed on this factor. Granted, Brazil created 
Centers Specialized in Rehabilitation with the promise of creating even more to provide 
treatment to children infected with Zika, however, the health care infrastructure was 
disproportionately located in the regions not afflicted with heavy outbreaks.88 Doctors 
and clinics are located in southeastern Brazil, while the poor northeastern region was 
ground-zero for the virus and the area most heavily afflicted.89 Brazil tried to remedy 
their lack of knowledge surrounding Zika by pledging large amounts of money to 
research institutions and biobanks to collect and analyze bodily fluids.90 Despite what 
seems like a wholistic response to the virus, the lack of preparation mentioned earlier set 
Brazil up for a mediocre response to Zika as mid-epidemic response were sporadic and 
untimely.  
The above synopsis of the Brazilians government’s efforts combatting Zika 
informs the pandemic report card found below in Figure 5. The reasoning behind each 
grade relates to information covered above. Brazil’s overall response was average, with 
an overall score of 10. 
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 This section will discuss the relevant descriptive statistics of the terrorist attacks 
in each country during the relevant timeframe. Each country will receive two tables and a 
graph. One table will show the distribution of terrorist attacks that occurred before, 
during, and after each pandemic. The next table shows the relevant descriptive statistics 
of each case, touching on the mean, median, mode, and standard deviation of the number 
of terrorist attacks. Next, a visual representation of the terrorist attacks via a scatterplot 
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and a trend line will aid the reader in understanding the overall trend of the number of 
attacks as we pass through each phase. It is important to note, that to help the audience, 
the scatterplot has been augmented with blue circles to show pre-pandemic activity, red 
squares for mid-pandemic levels, and yellow triangles for post-pandemic levels. 
Mexico and Swine Flu 
 During the time frame of 2007-2011, Mexico experienced 26 terrorist attacks by 
multiple groups, with the majority of them falling in 2007. One can see a distribution of 
these attacks by year below in Figure 7. On the surface, we see something interesting to 
note. During the year that Swine Flu was rampant in Mexico, 2009, they experienced the 
lowest number of terrorist activity throughout the five-year span. Beyond that, the two 
years that preceded Swine Flu, 2007 and 2008, saw 18 total attacks, while the two years 
following Swine Flu, 2010 and 2011, only saw seven attacks. 
 
 To decide how the attacks mid-Swine Flu compare to the average during this 
timeframe, one needs to consult descriptive statistics. Shown below in Figure 8, we can 
see the mean of the number of terrorist attacks per year between 2007 and 2011. It is 
important to remember that the mean is often thrown off by outliers in the data set. The 
only data point, which could potentially be considered an outlier is the one terrorist attack 
in 2009. While mean is susceptible to outliers, it is considered an adequate unit of 
measurement in this scenario as compared to the median because the mean is still higher 
than the median. That means that the outlier did not have that much effect on the average. 
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Upon analysis, with the average number of terrorist attacks for the timeframe being 5.2, 
the number of attacks in 2009 is well below average which further supports our 
hypothesis. The standard deviation of 3.8 also allows us to see that compared to the next 
case study, the data points are relatively close to the mean of 5.2 and only strengthens the 
trend line which will be introduced in the next paragraph. 
 
 The scatterplot below in Figure 9 shows the overall trend of the datapoints. We 
can see that even before the pandemic presents itself, that the number of terrorist attacks 
in Mexico is decreasing. While this trend is established before the introduction of Swine 
Flu, the outlying data point in 2009 still provides support for our hypothesis that 
Mexico’s response to the virus negatively influenced the number of terrorist attacks in 
Mexico that year. Interestingly enough, we also see that once the epidemic was 
considered to be over, the terrorist attacks rose back up to numbers above the outlier, but 
still stayed on the decreasing trend line. 
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 Overall, an analysis of this data in conjunction with the above average evaluation 
that Mexico received for their response to Swine Flu seems to provide preliminary 
support for the hypothesis. We see a steadily decreasing trend of terrorist attacks in 
Mexico between 2007 and 2011, with an extremely low outlier during the pandemic in 
2009. 
China and SARS 
 During the timeframe of 2000-2005, China experienced a total of 24 terrorist 
attacks. Figure 10 below shows the distribution of these attacks by year. Similar to 
Mexico, China also experiences an overall decrease in the number of terrorist attacks per 
year. The lowest number of terrorist attacks seem to occur post-SARS. 
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 Once we look at the descriptive statistics of the number of terrorist attacks in 
China between 2000 and 2005 in Figure 11, we can see a bit evidence against our 
hypothesis. In this case, median is the better unit of measurement to show the average of 
terrorist attacks per year during this timeframe. The outlier of 12 during 2001 throws the 
mean off greatly to 4. Since the mean rose 1.5 points above the median, as suspected by 
an outlier of 12, it is relatively easy to decide that median better shows the average 
number of attacks per year. Concerning the number of terrorist attacks mid-SARS, we 
can see that they are right around the average number per year of 2.5. Furthermore, when 
we look at the pre-SARS numbers, we see that both are at or above the average and 
suggest that while the years during the epidemic saw an average number of terrorist 
attacks, when compared to the years before the epidemic, there is substantially less 
activity. We also see that level of activity continue to decrease post-SARS.   
 
 If we consult Figure 12 below, one can see the overall trend of terrorist attacks 
steadily decreasing throughout the timeframe. Through the visualization, we can see that 
all but one of the data points, 12 in 2001, stuck within less than one standard deviation 
from the mean. This tells us that the trend is pretty consistent, and without the outlier in 
2001, the negative trend line would likely look relatively similar to a horizontal, yet 
slightly decreasing, line.   
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 Unfortunately, the above charts and graph do not support the hypothesis for this 
project. As China’s response was below average with a total score of 9, substantially 
worse in comparison to Mexico, we would expect to observe an increasing number of 
terrorist attacks per year. Adhering to the hypothesis, if not increasing, we would at least 
expect to see a sharp increase in terrorist attacks either during or after SARS given 
China’s poor response to the virus. However, we see none of this. The outlier comes 
before the epidemic and therefore offers no support for the hypothesis. 
Brazil and Zika 
 During the timeframe of 2013-2018, there were a total of 26 terrorist attacks in 
Brazil. Figure 13 below shows a yearly distribution of these attacks. Brazil experienced a 
number of attacks, with the lowest amount occurring both mid- and post-Zika, while also 
experiencing a dramatic outlier of 11 attacks in 2018. While Brazil received an average 
evaluation, they were on the lower end of the spectrum with 10. This outlier could 
potentially provide support for our hypothesis as it is also possible that an increase in 
 39 
terrorist attacks as a result of poor government response to a pandemic could be delayed a 
couple of years. 
 
 We get a clearer picture of the relationship once we look at the descriptive 
statistics offered in Figure 14. Given the outlier of 11 in 2018, we have to look closely at 
both the median and mean to determine which one better represents the average number 
of attacks over the course of the years. With the mean sitting at 4.3, .3 points above the 
median, it is possible to conclude that the outlier of 11 has skewed mean as an accurate 
unit of measurement. Therefore, we will proceed with the median, four, as the average. 
We see a bit of support for our hypothesis since the average number of attacks during 
Zika, 3.5, is relatively close to the average of 2013-2018. However, if we compare the 
average of mid-Zika numbers to the average of pre-Zika numbers, we see an increase of 
.5, which would not support the hypothesis. The average of post-Zika numbers is 6.5 and 
sit 2.5 points above the 2013-2018 average, which is attributed to the outlier in 2018. 
 
 When we look at the scatterplot and trendline of the number of terrorist attacks in 
Figure 15, we see instances of support and opposition for our hypothesis. The increasing 
trendline is likely due to the outlier in 2018. If we were to analyze the data points while 
excluding this outlier, we would see a relatively straight line which would support the 
hypothesis more of an average response receiving average trends of terrorism. While it 
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still may be true that increased terrorist numbers post-epidemic may be delayed by a 
couple of years, which would explain the outlier of 11 in 2018, we must approach this 
graph with caution. We must take into consideration all the data points, and therefore, the 
outlier of 11 in 2018 provides major opposition to our hypothesis as it skews the trend to 
be positive.  
 
Implications for the Hypothesis 
 The above figures and discussion of their pertinent aspects results in little 
conclusive support for our hypothesis. The hypothesis would lead us to expect that 
Mexico, who received the best evaluation, would see a decreasing trend of terrorist 
attacks while China would see increases in terrorist activity, and Brazil would see a 
constant and relatively un-changing trend line. While we do see moments of support, 
such as the overall trend of terrorist activity in Mexico, and the trend of Brazil minus an 
outlier, the case of China and random outliers present in some datasets leads me to 
conclude that these trend lines might be explained by another variable. Overall, I 
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conclude that there is not substantial evidence to support the alternate hypothesis, and as 
of now, there seems to be no significant relationship between how a government responds 
to a pandemic and the level of terrorism that country experiences. 
Considerations 
 While I conclude that there is not ample evidence to support my hypothesis, there 
are considerations and implications that this work can have for future scholars. This paper 
evaluated the government response as a whole and sought to statistically connect those 
grades to levels of terrorism. Future related research projects would likely do well to 
dissect the IV of this paper into several separate IVs and evaluate one at a time. Doing 
this would allow the researcher to narrow down their focus and more accurately evaluate 
the government’s response to the epidemic in that domain. Another avenue for future 
research would be to choose different cases to analyze, as scholars have already noted 
that democracies and autocracies differ in their reasons to respond to natural disasters and 
how effectively they do so.91 
Furthermore, the DV measured the level of terrorism. This DV did not consider 
fluctuations in violence in general, like violent crime. Violent crime would likely yield 
more data points and paint a better picture of how government response to a pandemic 
influences the level of violence in average citizens, and not those select few who are 
active in terrorist groups. Another avenue that would prove fruitful for future research is 
changing the DV to measure other methods of political violence, rather than terrorism. As 
mentioned in the literature review, groups seek to erode state legitimacy through both 
violent and non-violent means. It would be interesting to see if government response to a 
 
91 Quiroz Flores, Alejandro, and Alastair Smith. “Leader Survival and Natural Disasters.” British Journal of 
Political Science 43, no. 4, 2013: 821. 
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pandemic influences non-violent repertoire like social services, propaganda, or non-
violent protests. It is possible that the DV was not as affected by the IV because the 
population saw any government restrictions as a response to the pandemic as temporary. 
Perhaps future research would do well to conduct interviews of an affected population 
mid-pandemic to glean more into their opinion of their government’s response and how 
they feel about any government restrictions as a result of it. 
 Furthermore, I applied a U.S.-based document of the HHS to evaluate the efforts 
of these governments. Future projects could conduct the same evaluation with a different 
grading structure, as well as guiding it off of a separate pandemic response document. 
While conducting research for this project, I discovered a large vacuum for a potential 
database. There remains no substantial database which evaluates a country’s response to 
a pandemic. The void of a database like this means that any research done on a topic with 
a variable related to the one in this paper will always likely result in differing evaluations 
of a country’s response to a pandemic. Creating a centralized database which other 
scholars and researchers can refer to is likely the most important consideration of this 
work for future research on the topic. 
Conclusion 
 The above work compares government responses to a pandemic to that country’s 
level of terrorism. There remains a vast scholarly discussion that touches on several 
variables which explains an increased level of violence, this paper sought to choose those 
variables which are often consequences of a government response to an epidemic and 
explore if, in the context of a viral epidemic, they continue to influence instances of 
terrorism. While there was not enough concrete information to conclude a significant 
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relationship between these two variables, this paper addressed an under-studied aspect of 
social science and provided avenues for continued future research into the topic. This 
topic needs continued research as pandemics and terrorism have remained a constant 
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